Mustang Report # 9 - Civic Action

Maj. Glenn MacDonald: staff@militarycorruption.com

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Civic
Action, as I define it in my book Expendable Elite, is "The use
of American and local military, paramilitary or irregular forces on projects
useful to the local population in such fields as transportation, training,
public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation
and others contributing to economic and social development, which also serve to
improve the standing of the central government with the local population."

Have no
doubt in your minds that the need for effective civic action programs, using
qualified Special Operations personnel with a knowledge of the local language
or the availability of loyal interpreters is absolutely essential in Iraq and
Afghanistan or any other nation whose native people have been taught by one
method or another to dislike, distrust or even hate outsiders, especially Americans.
We must, as the words of the catchy phrase "Winning the Hearts and Minds
of the People" imply, do what is needed to develop a bond between our
forces and those who we have been sent to help.

This
concept was used very effectively during Special Forces instruction to the
officer's class I was part of on Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. It was in
the spring of 1964 when we were taught that one of the primary roles of the
U.S. Army Special Forces in a counter-insurgency warfare situation such as it
was in the Vietnam
"conflict," more aptly called a WAR.
Those of us who were on the ground facing the enemy knew it was a
war. Our mission in An Phu, South
Vietnam, would include civic action,
psychological warfare and military government operations such as we lived and
dealt with on a daily basis from 27
December 1965 through 2
August 1966.

Counter-Insurgency
is comprised of military, paramilitary, psychological warfare, political,
economical and civic actions taken by a government to defeat a subversive
insurgency. Conversely, insurgency is an
insurrection against a constituted government that falls short of civil war. Victory
by insurgency depends on the insurgent's ability to enlist the local
population, either by fear through intimidation or by convincing those same
people that their government is self-serving, thereby gaining their numbers in
the insurgent's base, and in doing so, weakening the government's capabilities
as their loyal base shrinks.

I like what
Hans Halberstadt, in his book Green Berets - Unconventional Warriors: In
Action With America's Elite Fighting Men (Berkley Books, NY © 1989,
said of the Army's Special Forces Organization: "It is, within the Army, a
group of men at the tactical level who are taught to look at conflict in a
radically different manner, in subtle political and social ways, at the reasons
behind conflict, rather than the popular and sensational reasons found on
television or in newspapers."

You will
learn, when you read Expendable Elite - One Soldier's Journey
Into Covert Warfare, that our Special Forces team A-424, working with the
Vietnamese Special Forces in An Phu, South
Vietnam, devoted 60% of our day-to-day
effort to civic action, psychological warfare and military government
operations. Our conscious efforts convinced the 64,000 people of An Phu that we
truly cared about them. We worked to show the central government in Saigon
that the Hoa Hao people posed no threat to them, which was what the government
once feared to be the case. We would, within 30 days of our taking on an
"independent warfare operation" mission, retake ground that had been
occupied by the enemy, provide a high level of security in our area, weed out
local insurgent sympathizers and gain the loyalty of the citizens. They then,
without fail, made us aware of any enemy activity, no matter how insignificant,
that could adversely affect the people of An Phu.

Colonel
Harry L. Corkill, speaking to me when I first reported in as a Sergeant First
Class to be his right hand man in the 82d Airborne Division Logistical Support
Center, expressed an "attitude" about dealing with people, telling me
what I will never forget: "Marv," he told me, "loyalty must
first go down and then it will bounce back up on its own and you can count on
that." With that in mind I led my
team of Green Berets in serving the people of An Phu in every aspect of our
independent operations, keeping their security and welfare uppermost in daily
priorities. Once, having witnessed our loyalty through individual and team actions,
the people, almost 100% Buddhists of the Hoa Haos Sect, understood that we
cared for them and they then did all they could to let us experience the
reality of their caring for us.

Proof of
the pudding? You could ask any of my men
who had been out on combat patrol with our Hoa Hao Irregulars, what it was like
and their most likely response would be to let you know that the only place the
enemy could have shot them would have been in the head because our Hoa Haos
would virtually surround them to protect them once bullets started flying.
Judging from that you can rest assured that we had, in fact, "won the
hearts and minds of the people."

© Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Marvin, U.S.
Army Special Forces (Retired)

Author of Victory Edition - Expendable Elite - One
Soldier's Journey Into Covert Warfare