Mustang Report # 11 - To Assassinate a Prince?

I would learn that Major Phoi Van
Le, whom Colonel Tuttle described as being “tougher than nails,” would be my
counterpart in An Phu as commander of the five CIDG companies and the LLDB
team. He was also the military advisor to the Hoa Hao central council and it
was Major Le, I was told by Colonel Tuttle, that met with General Quang Van
Dang (IV Tactical Zone CG) and somehow used the reputation of the Hoa Haos as
fierce and courageous fighters to convince General Dang that they should go
together to meet with Premier Ky’s Minister of Defense and obtain approval for
the defenders of An Phu to take the war into the safe-havens that had been
provided the enemy by our White House. This was in December 1965 and some seven
months after we had broken diplomatic relations with Prince Sihanouk. I was to
learn that President Johnson, against the desires of Premier
Ky, had approved the enemy’s use of Cambodian
Territory for safe havens. Insane?
Yes, and stupid too. It was aiding and abetting the enemy to permit them safe
areas where they could attack our forces from at will with no fear of our
following in hot pursuit once they got back across the border into Cambodia.

            We
were on a different playing field in An Phu. With our limited resources of men
and weapons we nonetheless took the war to Cambodia.  We were hamstrung to a certain extent by a total
lack of air, artillery or medical evacuation support. We decided to limit our
cross- border on the ground engagement with the enemy to a distance of three
kilometers inside Cambodia
so as to stay within support range of our own mortars. 

            In
June 1966, the CIA dispatched agent Walter Mackem to my camp to ask if I would
accept a mission to assassinate Cambodian Crown Prince Norodom Sihanouk. It
seems we were the closest camp to that area of Cambodia
where the crown prince reigned and our Hoa Hao irregular fighters had a
reputation for getting the job done. Knowing he was no friend of ours and that
he had allowed his territory to be used by our enemy, I had no qualms about
accepting the mission, but with a quid-pro-quo. Though we began immediately to
develop an ambush force of volunteers, gather the equipment and weapons needed
for a “sterile” mission and collaborate on a plan for infiltration, ambush and
escape back to camp, I had told Mackem that we would not step foot inside
Cambodia on that mission until I had proof that President Johnson had told the
American people that our country had permitted the enemy safe havens and had
immediately told the American people that our forces and allied forces had been
given the green light to pursue the enemy anywhere he fled, even inside
Cambodia.

            When
we were within days of sending our volunteers into Cambodia
to kill the prince I learned that there would be no White House move to deny
the enemy their safe havens. I immediately cancelled the mission and ordered
the agent out of my camp, only to be warned by him. “You can’t fight the
system, Captain” he hollered back to me as he was escorted to the waiting
chopper, “because you know you can’t win.”

            Details
of this unusual activity and how we survived the act of retribution concocted
by the CIA that would have had me, my men and our Hoa Hao fighters attacked by
a 1,000 man heavily armed ARVN regiment and how we successfully won victory in
Federal Court against the Special Forces Association when they tried in vain to
bankrupt me and my publisher remove my book from the market are clearly spelled
out in the Victory Edition of Expendable Elite – One Soldier’s Journey into
Covert Warfare.  

            Mustang Report # 12
will be about aiding the enemy. It is titled: A President's Fantasy is a Soldier's Curse.